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Revolution, nation and peace1
DOMENICO LOSURDO
1
THE IDEAL of perpetual peace, of a world that is definitively liberated from the plague of war, does not characterize exclusively the contemporaneous conscience, but does not lead us to very ancient 
times either. We can say that it goes back, fundamentally, to the struggles 
that preceded and succeeded the French Revolution. From that moment on, 
the reflection on peace is enriched by two radically new elements. It starts to 
be considered in Universalist terms. In Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, the ideal of 
the “perpetual peace” still concerns explicitly to Europe, or to “the Christian 
States”:2 those that sign the treaty banning war forever are the representatives 
of the Christian powers, which are, this way, enabled to face more effectively 
the menace of the “Turkish”, of the “Africa corsairs” and of the “Tartars”, and 
which, by repelling the eventual aggressions coming from that side, can even 
find “occasions for cultivating military genius and talents”.3
The other element of novelty is that, always beginning from the 
struggles that preceded and succeeded the French Revolution, the ideal of 
the perpetual peace ceases to be presented as a vain hope, and takes on a 
precise political dimension: now the political action is that is called to perform 
the ideal at issue. Now it is about detecting and attacking the forces that 
have interest in the war, and those are identified with the feudal system and 
the monarchic absolutism. Aiming at the cabinet wars of his time, Voltaire 
(2006, chap. VII) states that, in order to eliminate the periodical massacres 
between nations and men, it would be necessary to punish “those sedentary 
and slothful barbarians who, from their palaces, give orders for murdering a 
million of men, and then solemnly thank God for their success”.
Rousseau (1959, p.593), in his turn, states that “war and conquest on 
the one hand and advance of despotism on the other hand give each other 
mutual support”. The war, then, fixes its roots not in the alleged wickedness of 
the human nature, in the original sin, but in the concrete, established political-
social institutions. Rousseau does not hesitate in drawing every consequence 
from this formulation. Given the existence of forces interested in the war, 
the resort to the revolutionary violence is inevitable: so, “in default of such 
spontaneous agreement, the one thing left is force; and then the question is no 
longer to persuade but to compel; not to write books but to raise armies “. As
a matter of fact, the cosmopolite bond between peoples and States cannot be 
constituted “except by a revolution” (ibidem, p.595-600).
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A radical inversion of positions was produced with regard to Saint-Pierre 
(1986, p.40-1 and 164ss). In his view, the treaty that established the perpetual 
peace played also the role of ensuring the inner stability, that is, of “preserving 
unfailingly” the signatory States “from any secession, any insurrection, and, 
mainly, any civil war”, an evil regarded as even “more terrible” and “more 
unfortunate” than the “foreign” wars (ibidem, p.41 and 143). If, in Saint-Pierre, 
the purpose of the perpetual peace imposes the suffocation of the revolutions 
(and the capital punishment for the “rioters” and “rebels”), in Rousseau, the 
political revolution is presented as the mandatory path for the instauration of 
the perpetual peace. “Pacifism” leads Saint-Pierre to condemn the first English 
revolution; in Rousseau’s “pacifism” it is already possible to perceive the growth 
of the revolutionary wave that would unsettle the face of France and Europe.
The anti-feudal and anti-absolutist revolution, recognized by Rousseau 
as the true antidote to the plague of war, breaks out a few years later. With the 
wave of enthusiasm, not only in France, but also abroad, illusions are diffused 
according to which the knocking down of the feudal regime in an international 
scale would eventually and definitively eradicate the plague of war. From Paris, 
Mirabeau could announce that, following the conquest of the “general freedom”, 
the “unreasonable envies that torment the nations” would also disappear, and the 
“universal brotherhood” would arise.4 After having denounced in the despotism, 
the ambition and the yearning towards domination by the feudal courts the 
cause for the endless wars that had been dilacerating humanity, other numerous 
protagonists of the Revolution promised the fulfillment of the “philanthropic 
dream of the abbot of Saint-Pierre”.5
Significantly, Barnave particularly insists on the beneficial effect of the 
owners’ control over the Legislative Power. However, he too had the opinion 
that the war could be extirpated by the elimination of the absolute power of the 
kings that could launch themselves in adventures of war without any control and, 
mainly, without running any risk. On the contrary, “the parliament will hardly 
decide in favor of war. Each one of us possesses properties, friends, a family, 
a set of personal interests that the war could jeopardize”.6 As a matter of fact, 
the new revolutionary France was committed not to start a conquest war; it was 
solemnly committed – as the 1793 Constitution stated – not to intervene “in 
the government of the other nations”. Or, in order to use the terms of the 1791
Constitution: “The French nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a 
view of making conquests, and it will never use its forces against the liberty of any 
people”.
For the first time in history, a country was committed to conduct a policy 
of peace, and the ideal of the perpetual peace found its praise, however indirect, 
in a constitutional text. It is a radical novelty. For Grotius, the interpreter, in a 
certain way, of the results of the Dutch Revolution, the right to reduce to slavery, 
by means of the war, not only the individuals but also whole populations (cf. 
Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, liv.III, chap.VIII, par.1) is not disputable. He had 
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in mind, certainly, the colonized populations, since “the nations in which jus 
illud servitutis ex bello in usu non est” (liv.III, chap.XIV, par.9.) are explicitly 
excluded. One cannot find a criticism to war even in the “Declaration of Rights”, 
derived from the English “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, the Declaration of 
Independence or the constitutional texts originated by the American Revolution: 
the rules for the Army recruitment in the event of war were established, but the 
war remains as a matter of fact and not as a problem. The war only becomes a 
real problem with the French Revolution: a problem that the political action is 
requested to solve in order to definitively ensure peace.
We have, so far, mentioned only the second of the radical novelties 
originated by the French Revolution; it is relevant to mention the first one too. 
Peace, construed in a Universalist sense, is not thought of in terms of exclusion of 
the non-Christians any longer; the enemy is not the “infidel” or the “barbarian” 
anymore, but the tyrant and the sectarian of the despotism, which have interest 
in or help to perpetuate the condition of war. One can detect a confirmation 
of this Universalist starting point also in the decision of Robespierre and of 
the Convention to abolish slavery in the colonies. Saint-Pierre writes his Projet 
at the moment of the Treaty of Utrecht, which permits to England, coming 
recently out of its “Glorious Revolution”, to take from Spain the Asiento, that 
is, the monopoly of the traffic of blacks. And the perpetual peace is invoked by 
Saint-Pierre (1986, p.17) also on behalf of safety and freedom “of trade, both in 
America and in the Mediterranean”. In these “two trades”, which “comprise over 
half of the income of England and the Netherlands” (ibidem), the traffic of the 
blacks, the trade of slaves was also included, as the texts of political economics 
of the time clearly evidence.7 But, for Rousseau (Social contract, I, 4), slavery is 
simply the continuation of the state of war. Objectively, the reality of war can 
also be detected in the trade that is ensured by the perpetual peace, and the 
realization of an authentic peace implies, at the same time, the liberation of the 
slaves of the colonies. The problem of peace starts not to be able to be thought of 
in exclusively European terms any longer.
In this picture, we can clearly see the consequences brought by the French 
Revolution to the debate on the theme of the independence of each State and 
the international relations between the States. In Saint-Pierre (1986), the treaty 
that establishes the perpetual peace supposes the reciprocal commitment of 
non-intervention. However, there are two exceptions to this principle: the first 
one, explicit, at the expense of the revolutionaries; the second one, implicit, at 
the expense of the non-Christians: “the European society will occupy itself of 
the government of each State only in order to preserve its fundamental shape 
and to rescue, in a quick and effective fashion, in the monarchies, the prince, 
and in the republics, the magistrates, against the rioters and the rebels” (ibidem, 
p.164). In its turn, the “European society”, even when not displaying an attitude 
openly hostile to the Muslim States, has the right of resorting to the force to 
constrain them to adhere to the Treaty, and to adhere in a subaltern position, 
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since they should promulgate “several articles in favor of the Christians, their 
subjects” (ibidem, p.161). From this perspective, Saint-Pierre does not go beyond 
the traditional foundations of the international law. Alberigo Gentile regards as 
illicit the subjection of the prisoners to slavery, but only on what concerns to the 
Christian States. Balthazar Ayala, another author that is regarded by the school of 
Carl Schmitt as one of the craftsmen of the theory of the war limitation, excludes 
any limitation on what concerns to rebels and heretics, against whom he invokes, 
on the contrary, a kind of exterminating crusade (Grewe, 1988, p.252 and 246ss; 
see also Schmitt, 1950, p.123-31).
Robespierre, Danton and Marat, engraving of 1882 by Alfred Loudet.
We can say that, in his crusade against the French Revolution, Burke 
(1826a, p.123ss and 145) identifies the figure of the revolutionary with that 
of the non-Christian or barbarian: the rulers of the new France are, therefore, 
condemned as “savages” and “atheistic and murderous barbarians”, as individuals 
that, due to “their ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous spirit, their habits 
of defying every thing human and divine”, should be regarded as “ferocious 
savages”. In such a case – as observed by Gentz (1836-1837, p.198ss), translator 
of Burke in German and future counselor of Metternich -, the principle of 
independence of each State has no meaning any longer: in face of a revolution 
such as the one produced in France, which changes the political-social order, 
“publicly insults the religious concepts and violates everything that is sacred for 
men”, it is not possible anymore, and not even allowed, that the other States 
remain aloof; the intervention is not only legitimate, it is an obligation.
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On the opposite side, the principle of the right to independence and self-
determination was radicalized by Marat, to the extent of including the right to 
secession for the colonies. Santo Domingo, therefore, where, in the meantime, an 
insurrection of the black population had risen, had the right of being separated 
from France, even from the revolutionary France, in order to become an 
autonomous State, and not under the control of white and proslavery settlers, but 
under the leadership of black slaves or ex-slaves that constituted the great majority 
of the population.8 If the anti-revolutionary publications placed France among 
the “savages”, denying its right to independence, Marat broke the traditional 
distinction between “savages” and “civilized men”, acknowledging also to the 
first ones the right to self-determination.
2
The enthusiasm that the French Revolution causes beyond the Rhein may 
also be construed to the light of the new approach to the issue of peace. It is 
in this context that the fundamental essay by Kant, of 1795, For the perpetual 
peace, is placed. The “first definitive article for the perpetual peace” is already 
unequivocal: “The civil constitution of every State should be republican”. Despite 
all the attenuating circumstances that follow such statement, one must keep 
in mind that, at that moment, the main country with a republican regime was 
precisely the revolutionary France. Kant proceeds as follows:
But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore 
not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of 
a state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force 
him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces, 
and court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on war, without any 
significant reason, as a kind of amusement.9
The harsh denouncement that is made here of those responsible for the 
war aims, explicitly, at the feudal courts, whose corrupted and decadent lifestyle is 
described and denounced in a precise and merciless fashion.
The fifth “preliminary article” also possesses a significant meaning: 
“[The States] do not interfere in the government of other nations”. Kant’s text 
reproduces here, in substance, the aforementioned article of the Constitution of 
1793. Based on the defense of the principle of each State’s independence, Kant 
does not hesitate in harshly criticizing the policy of conquest and abuse of power 
of Europe in its colonies, and, above all, of England. With a transparent allusion 
to that country, Kant denounces, with flaming words, “the inhospitable conduct 
of the civilized states of our continent, especially the commercial states”. Precisely, 
“the injustice which they display in visiting foreign countries and peoples (which 
in their case is the same as conquering them) seems appallingly great”. This 
“inhospitable conduct” advanced to the extent of reducing whole populations to 
slavery: and, thus, the “sugar islands” are indicated as “site of the cruelest and 
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most refined slavery”. And all this is done by “powers” that “make much ado 
about religion”!10 The countries that refused to follow the example posed by 
the Republican France with the abolition of slavery in the colonies were those 
committed with the counter-revolutionary crusade also in name of Christianity.
In the meantime, however, within the political and military sphere, the 
relations of force were quickly changing in favor of France: its armies shifted from 
a defensive position to a counter-offensive one, advancing and going beyond the 
borders. The turn in the military plane is also reflected in the ideological plane. 
The Constitution of 1793, when pronouncing against any form of interference 
in the internal affairs of another country, was limited to adding that “the French 
nation is the friend and natural ally of free nations”: a formula that could, at the 
most, open the way for a policy of hegemony on what concerned to countries 
and populations that were already “free”, but that did not authorize, whatsoever, 
an intervention by the French army to “release” the populations that were still 
oppressed by the “despotism”. But in the Convention already, voices are heard 
that ascribe the contribution of the new France to the execution of the perpetual 
peace not to the abstention from any war of aggression, but to the exportation 
of the revolution, a kind of internationalist assistance to the other populations so 
that they can, in their turn, get free from despotism, which is the true cause of 
the fratricide wars between nations. Among those voices, the one of a German 
emigrant, Anacharsis Clootz, stands out; in April 26, 1793, wishing a definitively 
pacified universal republic, he states: “the national Convention will not forget 
that we are the mandataries of humankind: our mission is not circumscribed to 
the departments of France; our powers are confirmed by the whole nature”.11
It is, however, the Girondist project of Constitution that is truly 
characterized by a clear design of expansion and hegemony. This project has 
been turned down by the Convention, but it is convenient to examine it to get 
acquainted, at the same time, with the basic trends that emerged little by little 
in the new bourgeois France of the first years of its life, and with the arguments 
by means of which those trends were justified, that is, with the ideological 
instruments that enabled the very revolutionary ideals, which were still intensely 
felt, to be put at the service of an expansionist policy. The whole “Titre XIII” 
of the Girondist project was concerned with the “international relations of the 
French Republic”. After having stated (article One) that “the French Republic 
will only take weapons to preserve its liberty, to conserve its territory and to 
defend its allies”, with the article Two it left the door open to annexations: “The 
French Republic solemnly renounces to incorporate foreign regions to its territory, 
unless according to the wish freely expressed by the majority of its inhabitants, 
and only in the case in which the regions requesting this incorporation will not 
be incorporated and united to another nation due to a social pact expressed in a 
previous Constitution and freely consented” (Buchez & Roux, 1834, v.XXLV,
p.153). Due to the fact that, at that moment, it was surrounded by the feudal 
Europe, that is, by countries that were dominated by despotism, the revolutionary 
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France could easily annex region after region: the concept of the “social pact” as 
an instrument of fight against the feudal oppression became an instrument of the 
revived French expansionism.
The one opposing to the inversion, in an expansionist sense, of the 
Universalist content of the French Revolution was Robespierre. His is a harsh 
polemic against “the inopportune preacher of the one and universal Republic”, 
assimilated to the counter-revolutionaries (1958, v.III, p.101 – December 25, 
1793); his is a piercing irony against those that want something that is not quite 
clear: “the universal republic or, rather, the universal conflagration” (1967, v.X, 
p.267 – December 23, 1793); his is a lucid advice not to forget that “nobody 
loves armed missionaries” (1958, v.I, p.129 – January 2, 1792); his is a clear 
refusal of the “habit of making every nation happy and free, is spite of itself”. On
the contrary, “all kings could have led passive lives or die unpunished on their 
bloodstained thrones, if they had known how to respect the independence of 
the French people” (1967, v.X, p.230 – December 5, 1793). Of course, also in 
Robespierre it is possible to catch a glimpse of relapses, but his basic formulation 
refuses, unequivocally, the theory of the revolution exportation.
It is a theory that finds adepts even outside France. When writing 
The mission of man, in 1799, Fichte repeats that the condition for the 
accomplishment of the perpetual peace is the triumph, in the international sphere, 
of a rational political constitution, of the “true State”. But how to achieve such 
result? He formulates well the hypothesis that internal revolutionary agitations 
would accelerate the crisis of the feudal system; but, with a change concerning to 
the past, Fichte presents an entirely different hypothesis:
No free State can reasonably accept within it forms of government in which 
the leaders are interested in subjugating the neighboring populations and 
that, therefore, by their very existence, continuously threaten their neighbors’ 
tranquility: the concern for their own safety drives every free people to equally 
transform every neighboring population in a free State [...] and, thus, since a few 
truly free States come to be, the realm of culture and freedom, and with it the 
realm of the universal peace, will eventually and necessarily embrace, little by 
little, the whole universe. (Losurdo, 1983-1984, p.135-45)
The roots of war will be definitively pulled up by successive waves of 
exportation of the revolution, which will overthrow the non-free States that 
had not yet succumbed after internal revolutions. With Napoleon, the intention 
of expansionism and colonial conquering becomes more and more evident, by 
a country that had, however, promised freedom and perpetual peace; and this 
provokes in Germany a huge crisis of the myths of the revolutionary France, 
and, by consequence, a reactionary wave and a turbid chauvinism (Losurdo, 
1989, chap. I, 1). It is, on the contrary, an extremely dry balance that is outlined 
by Engels (1955, v.XX, p.239), in the late nineteenth century, for the period 
comprised between 1789 and the triumphal campaigns of Napoleon: “The 
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perpetual peace that had been promised becomes an endless war of conquest”. 
But this assessment does not mean, such as in so many contemporaries of Engels, 
the celebration of war and the derision of the ideal of the perpetual peace. No; 
it only means that the process of realization of such ideal was way more complex 
and tortuous, and implied political-social changes that were far more radical than 
what had been forecast in the beginning.
Ironizing, instead, the failure of the perpetual peace, Joseph de Maistre 
(1884, v.V, p.24ss) celebrates war as a sacred rite of some sort, to whose charm 
nobody can be immune:
Don’t you hear the earth that screams and demands blood [...]? Haven’t you 
noticed that, in the field of death, a man never disobeys? He can slaughter Nerva 
or Henry IV; but the most abominable tyrant, the most arrogant butcher of 
human flesh will never hear: we do not wish to serve you any longer. A rebellion 
in the battlefield, an agreement of fraternization against the tyrant, such is a 
phenomenon of which we have no recollection.
Maistre may have been right, but only on what concerns to the history 
that he had behind him: the Revolution of October is the first revolution that 
has risen from the waves of the fight against war, exalting once more the ideal of 
perpetual peace originated by the French Revolution, and enriching, in a certain 
way, the catalogue of the human rights with the fundamental right to peace.
Earl Joseph de Maistre 
(1753 – 1821)
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3
A period of enthusiasm that could be compared to the one risen by the 
French Revolution occurred, in a much bigger scale, following the Revolution of 
October. The Universalist and internationalist character is even more accentuated. 
Lenin (“War and revolution”, 1955, v.XXIV, p.412) had observed that the 
dominant ideology did not regard as real wars the colonial adventures, but 
regarded them as mere operations of an international police, operations which 
implied, however, gigantic massacres. With the Revolution of October, instead, 
we insistently talk about those that are defined as “colonial slaves”, seen as one 
of the forces that are protagonists of the struggle that should, finally, eliminate 
the national oppression and the war.12 The imperialist States that contend for 
the colonies with the war are denounced by Lenin (“Socialism and war”, 1955, 
v.XXI, p.276ss) as proslavery States. If, in 1789, the roots of war were found in 
the feudal system and in the monarchic absolutism, now they are found in the 
system of the capitalism and the imperialism. This is the analysis that appears 
in Lenin’s texts, as well as in the documents of the communist International. 
But it is advisable to reproduce here, due to its didactic clearness and efficacy, a 
statement, although very posterior, by Mao Tse Tung:
“War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally eliminated by 
the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future too. But there 
is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose 
counterrevolutionary war with revolutionary war…”
Vladimir I. Ulianov, aka Lenin Mao Zedong, aka Mao Tse Tung
(1870 – 1924)          (1893 – 1976)
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In order to apprehend the real meaning of that statement, one must 
keep in mind that, at that moment, the Japanese imperialism had already 
invaded China, and, in consequence, the arms were in charge. The approach 
that appears is, in a certain way, similar to the one we have seen in Rousseau: 
regardless of the concrete, particular struggles, diversely articulated at 
each time, the war as a general phenomenon is eventually eliminated by a 
revolutionary process that pulls out its roots all at once and for good. “When 
human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, 
there will be no more wars, counter-revolutionary or revolutionary, unjust or 
just; that will be the era of perpetual peace for mankind”.13 The establishment 
of the perpetual peace no longer presupposes the disappearance of the despots 
and feudal lords, but the disappearance of the capitalists, as well as of the social 
classes in general.
If, in Russia, the Revolution of October had been successful, one year 
later the people revolutions swept, in Germany and Austria, the dynasties of the 
Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs and proclaimed the Republic, even if the situation 
was not yet stabilized; in March and April, 1919, the proletarian revolution 
seemed to triumph in Hungary and Bavaria, at the same time that, in its turn, 
Italy was on the verge of being unsettled by the movement of occupation of the 
factories. All of these events seemed to justify the hope for a quick transition 
from capitalism to socialism in a European or even global scale. There were many 
exalted statements, or that, at least, seem like that to us nowadays. Some weeks 
after the foundation of the communist International, Zinoviev expressed his 
thoughts as follows:
“Old Europe is rushing toward revolution at breakneck speed. In a twelve-month 
period we shall already have begun to forget that there was ever a struggle for 
Communism in Europe, for in a year the whole of Europe will be Communist 
and the struggle will have begun to extend to America and perhaps also Asia and 
other continents.” (Agosti, 1974, p.75) 
In his turn, Lenin himself, usually so a lucid mind, had stated, in his final 
speech delivered in the Congress of foundation of the International: “The victory 
of the proletarian revolution on a world scale is assured. The founding of an 
international Soviet republic is on the way.” (ibidem, p.74). And the international 
soviet republic would mean the establishment of the perpetual peace: what 
reasons for war could still subsist, at the moment in which the global system of 
capitalism and imperialism was eliminated and the boundaries between States and 
the national rivalries disappeared?
At this moment, the struggle for the triumph of socialism in a European 
or even global scale is still pervaded by the anti-militarist theme, and of 
commitment for the peace, that had characterized the Revolution of October; 
and it is strongly entwined to the denouncement of the counter-revolutionary 
intervention at the expense of the young Soviet Union, and to the struggle for the 
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acknowledgement of every country’s and every people’s right to independence and 
self-determination; for the acknowledgement, therefore, of a right that constitutes 
one of the fundamental conditions for the establishment of an international 
order of peace. However, tendencies of a rather different signal start already to be 
outlined. Always during the first congress of the communist International (1970, 
p.98), Trotsky, after having stated that the Red Army was felt and regarded by its 
best soldiers “not only the guard of the Russian Socialist Republic but also the 
Red Army of the Third International”, concluded as follows:
“And if today we do not even dream about invading the Eastern Prussia – on 
the contrary, we would be quite happy if Mr. Ebert and Mr. Scheidemann 
would leave us alone -, it is certain, however, that, when the time comes that 
our Western brethren call us to help them, our answer will be: ‘Here we are!’” 
(ibidem)
After having been unleashed and having achieved victory on the wave of 
the struggle for peace, the Revolution of October is invoked as an instrument to 
legitimate a revolutionary expansion policy that does not respect the boundaries 
between the States and nations.
We face here a dialectics that is similar to the one that was developed 
after the French Revolution. That is the reason why Gramsci (1975, p.1730) 
denounces, in the theory of the “permanent revolution”, a “form of anachronic 
and unnatural napoleonism”. But this condemnation of the Trotskyan 
“napoleonism” does not reveal a clear judgment about the “napoleonism” itself. 
How to evaluate the Great Nation that was born from the French Revolution, 
or, in better words, from the counter-offensive that has developed subsequently 
to the defeat of the intervention of the reaction; how to judge this Great Nation 
that had objectively contributed to accelerate the crisis and the defeat of the 
feudal system in an international scale, but which had progressively given itself up 
to a policy of national oppression and even of plunder of a colonial kind? It is a 
problem that reclaims Lenin’s attention mainly after the Revolution of October, 
at the moment in which he deepened his reflection on the dialectics that was 
developed following 1789, when “the epoch of the revolutionary wars in France 
gave way to the era of the wars of imperialist conquest”.
Significantly, at the moment of the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the struggle 
of the young soviet Russia against the aggression of the German imperialism is 
by Lenin compared to the struggle that, in other times, had been conducted by 
Prussia (although guided by the Hohenzollerns) against the Napoleonic invasion 
and occupation, while, in its turn, it is Napoleon to be defined as “a pirate 
similar to those that the Hohenzollerns are today”.14 France, which had seen the 
Revolution’s triumph, particularly on the wave of the struggle against the cabinet 
wars and the colonial adventure policy that were characteristic of the feudal 
courts, which had become the country propagating the ideal of the universal 
peace, and which, at a certain moment, had effectively incarnated such ideal with 
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its claim of every country’s right to independence – that very France had turned 
into an expansionist power. Since the line of demarcation between progress and 
reaction, as well as between forces of peace and forces of war, cannot be defined 
once and for all, it is susceptible to changes and inversions that can be radical and, 
in any case, should be defined by the concrete analysis of the concrete situation.
In other words, countries and peoples had the right to claim independence 
and self-determination also in face of the revolutionary and Napoleonic France. 
As we can see, Lenin was flatly hostile to any form of napoleonism. Thus, it is 
easy to understand his concern, once the perspective of the “international soviet 
republic” vanished, with developing the rules of pacific coexistence between 
countries with different social regimes.
The hopes of peace raised by the Revolution of October do not seem, 
however, to have had a better result than that of the French Revolution. From 
the French Revolution to the Revolution of October: is the history of the ideal 
of peace between the nations the history of two failures? As a matter of fact, 
even more serious accusations are made today against the revolutionary ideal of 
the perpetual peace. According to Carl Schmitt (1950, 1963; cf. also Schnur, 
1983) and to the publications based on him, it was the political tradition that 
was developed from the French Revolution to the Revolution of October 
that had forged, with the universalism, the ideological instrument to justify a 
universal interventionism. Mainly, the revolutionary political tradition, with its 
universalism, had constructed “the absolute enmity”, this new picture unknown 
to the jus publicum europaeum, and in which one should look for the origin of 
the massacres and the catastrophe of the West. In this picture, the revolutionary 
ideal of the perpetual peace would have meant, for true, the retaking of the wars 
of religion.
It would be easy to demonstrate, within the historical sphere, the 
falseness of that scheme, highlighting the fact that the counter-revolutionary 
international intervention, at first against France that had destroyed the Ancien 
Régime, then against the young Soviet Union, was conducted precisely as a 
crusade to defend “civilization”, and, sometimes, even religion. Long before 
Schmitt, it was Edmund Burke (1826b, v.VII, p.13ss) to see in the French 
Revolution “a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma” that, due to its “spirit 
of proselytism”, led to think about the protestant reform, although it was a 
proselytism at the service of an impious and atheist doctrine.
Schmitt, who denounces the French revolutionaries as solely responsible 
for the retaking of the wars of religion in Europe, is, however, contradicted 
precisely by Burke (1826a, v.VII, p.174ss), who, after having denounced the 
Revolution’s impiety, launches his appeal to a general war (a true crusade) against 
France, to a war that is explicitly configured as “a religious war”, in the literal 
sense of the term. A war that was “in many respects entirely different” from the 
traditional wars, from the traditional conflicts between a nation and another 
(Burke, s. d., v.VII, p.387).15
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This time, what was at stake was the “Cause of Humanity”; it was about 
saving “the civilized World from impiety and barbarism”, removing the menace 
that hovered over “the happiness of the whole Civilized World”. It was about, 
ultimately, a “civil war” of an international nature. For this reason, the troops 
engaged against the revolutionary France were “the Avengers of the Injuries and 
outrages which have been offered to the Human Race”: they were summoned 
not only to confront the French battalions, but also to extirpate Jacobinism “in 
the place of its origin”, to proceed, subsequently, to the “exemplary punishment 
of the principal Authors and Contrivers of its ruin”. It is a true Crusade that 
is planned: it is not by chance that Burke receives a letter from the Pope, who 
blesses his noble devotion to the defense of the causa humanitatis.16 And it is not 
by chance, either, that Burke (1826c, v.V, p.278), when appealing to a general 
war against France, makes reference to the example of the alarm raised in his time 
across the whole Europe by the Anabaptist agitation. In this sense, contrarily to 
the theses of Schmitt, the war of religion has never completely ceased, even in 
Europe; only the heretics became, more and more clearly, the revolutionaries and 
annihilators of the social order.
Carl Schmitt does not hide his admiration for Joseph de Maistre, “this 
great and brave thinker of the Ancient Regime”; and, sure enough, Maistre is 
the first to accuse the French Revolution of making barbaric and impious even 
the gentlemanly “European war”, in which “only soldier fought against soldier, 
while the nations were never in war”. On the other hand, however, Maistre 
celebrates “the enthusiasm of the bloodshed” and seems even to justify the 
genocide of the Indians. It is true: “the discovery of the New World” was “the 
death sentence of three million Indians”. But, in the end, “there was a profound 
truth” – Maistre states - “in this first movement of the Europeans that refused, in 
the century of Columbus, to recognize as their fellow creatures the degenerated 
men that populated the New World”. The disappearance of the gentlemanly wars 
is regretted only on what concerns to that region of the world, the European 
nations, over which “the divine spirit” shines in a very particular fashion.17
The same can be said about Carl Schmitt. When denouncing the total 
and discriminatory war, he deplores the disappearance of the jus publicum 
europaeum, deplores the disappearance of the restrictions that the war had 
established exclusively within the Western community. The restricted war, non-
total and non-discriminatory, presupposes a “homogeneity in the civilization 
sphere”, and this homogeneity the Schmitt of the thirties refused to recognize 
both to Ethiopia and the African countries, and to the Soviet Union, which 
he situated outside Europe. Even within Europe, always for the Schmitt of the 
thirties, the populations that were unable to provide themselves with a State, 
and the small States, could not be regarded as “subject to the international 
law”.18 Thus, the way becomes open for the discriminatory and total war 
against the countries placed outside the jus publicum europaeum (although, 
from an “externally” geographic perspective, they belong to Europe). And, in 
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this, Schmitt situates himself in a position of ideal continuity with the counter-
revolution theoreticians: after having defined, as we have seen, the French 
revolutionaries as “atheistic and murderous barbarians”, Burke (s. d., v.VII, 
p.382) insists in the substantial unity of the Christian Europe, on what concerns, 
at the same time, to the Turks and the Jacobins; the latter ones, moreover, are 
regarded as much worse than the Turks themselves. We could say that Burke 
excludes from the jus publicum europaeum the Turks and the revolutionary 
France, as well as Schmitt will later do with Ethiopia, with the countries that 
are unable to constitute a State, and with the Soviet Union. To regard as 
exclusively due to the revolutionary tradition the re-ideologization of war, after 
the end of the wars of religion - as Schmitt and his disciples do -, is, therefore, a 
simplification that is on the dangerous verge of the historical falsification.
The fact remains that the hopes of realization of the perpetual peace were 
fulfilled neither by the French Revolution nor by the Revolution of October: 
bloody conflicts occurred, even between States that regarded themselves as 
socialist. Should we, therefore, conclude that the revolutionary utopia of the 
perpetual peace has failed? Facing the evidence of facts, facing the continuity of 
the phenomenon of war, should we conclude that the thinking of Maistre, exempt 
of the “utopia”, of the “messianic” illusion of a warless world, reveals, on this 
issue, a higher theoretical and scientific dignity than, for instance, the thinking of 
Kant? Such would be an oversimplified and arbitrary conclusion.
Let’s make it clear: we should not oppose here two personalities, or even 
two ideals. It is not about justifying Kant based on the nobleness of his ideal; it 
is about comparing two opposed analyses of the phenomenon of war within a 
rigorously scientific sphere. Well, Maistre proceeds to a forced naturalization of a 
political-social phenomenon (“it is the earth that screams and demands blood”), 
in such a way that the war is seen as a divine malediction (or blessing), which 
is impossible to avoid, as a phenomenon that has no relationship whatsoever 
with the political-social actions and institutions; it is an extremely ideological 
discourse, since it exculpates beforehand the ones that are responsible for any war. 
On the opposite side, Kant identifies the link between the cabinet wars of his 
time and the feudal regime, although having the illusion that the disappearance 
of the cabinet wars, following the abolition of the feudal regime, would have 
meant the disappearance of the phenomenon of war as such (an amazing illusion, 
if we keep in mind that the very essay For the perpetual peace starts to glimpse 
and denounce the wars of a new kind, caused by the colonial expansion). In its 
whole, however, if we intend to perform a correct ponderation, the revolutionary 
illusion and the utopical tension that pass through Kant’s writing reveal its precise 
scientific dimension, in opposition to the political “realism” of Maistre, which is 
but a mere ideology.
We have seen Engels’ verification of how illusory the perpetual peace 
promised by the protagonists of the French Revolution was. That promise 
contained a basic ambiguity: if Barnave pointed out in the power of the owners 
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and in the weight of their interests the assurance of the maintenance of peace, 
others made reference to the humblest social strata of the population (in the 
German land, Fichte places his hopes on the “peasants”, on the “artisans”, on 
the “children of the people” that were sent to the massacre by the holders of 
the power) (Losurdo, 1983-1984, p.132ss). The ambiguity of the promises of 
perpetual peace made by the revolutionaries is, intrinsically, the ambiguity that 
is inherent to the Third State as such. Now it becomes easier to understand 
the critical consideration of Engels, and, however, such consideration does not 
spill from the so-called “realism” that would like to make of war something 
natural and everlasting. The scientific result of the analysis of Kant (and of the 
protagonists of the French Revolution) is solid: the bond between the cabinet 
wars and the Ancient was confirmed; now, it is time to proceed further.
Similar considerations can be made on what concerns to the hopes raised 
by the Revolution of October. Its contribution was undeniably great, not only 
in the political sphere but also in the more strictly scientific one, to apprehend, 
behind the torrents of grandiloquent, overpatriotic and chauvinistic sentences, the 
real logic (the race to take hold of the markets and raw materials, to obtain higher 
profits, to achieve hegemony) that led to proofs of force and to massacres in the 
colonies and in the global ambit. Does such logic cease in a total and definitive 
way with the occurrence of a radical transformation in the relations of property 
and production? And what ulterior mechanisms can break out within the socialist 
societies or in those that proclaim themselves as socialist, and give rise to new 
tensions, rivalries and national conflicts?
The issue remains unsolved, but it cannot be solved by the dissolution 
of the patrimony not only of political experiences, but also of the historically 
accumulated scientific knowledge. One thing is for true: there is no way back to 
the position held previous to 1917, and still less to 1789. The war cannot become 
a fact again: it is a problem. The pacifist movements developed in our time are not 
restricted to the struggle, that is fair and absolutely necessary, to hinder and stop 
this or that given conflict; they have a higher ambition: to identify and eliminate, 
once and for all, every mechanism that causes war and impedes the occurrence 
of an enduring and perpetual peace. Such ambition would be inconceivable 
without the two great revolutions that have marked the contemporaneous world. 
However, due precisely to the fact that the war has become, in an irreversible 
fashion, not a natural event, but a political-social problem, it calls into play precise 
responsibilities.
The rulers, the power and the political institutions are called to answer for 
the war, or for the preparation of the war. This presupposition, nowadays obvious, 
of the pacifist movement, has the French Revolution and the Revolution of October 
at its back. The fate of Louis XVI was decided also due to his machinations to 
precipitate France into a war that, he expected, could cause the rebirth of the 
monarchic absolutism. And the end of the czars was marked by the struggle of a 
whole population against the imperialist massacre. Since then, the kings and the 
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rulers that were called to answer – if not before a court of law, at least politically 
– for their responsibilities in the unleashing or preparation of war are countless. 
Even regardless of the atrocities and war crimes, the unleashing of a war, of an 
aggression, is more and more construed and condemned as a crime. And this 
awareness is the most important result obtained by mankind along the lengthy way 
that led from the French Revolution to the Revolution of October, in pursuit of an 
ideal, that of perpetual peace, whose concretization we are still far from glimpsing.
The limitation of war has developed in a different way from what had been 
imagined by Schmitt, as well as by those that were nostalgic of a jus publicum 
europaeum, which excluded the colonies and everything that was outside the 
“authentic” Europe and West, and which did not hesitate in expelling, from the 
“authentic” Europe and West, the rebels and revolutionaries. At the times of 
acute crisis, the lack of universalism would eventually put under discussion the 
limitations of war also within Europe.
The ideas originated by the events of 1789 and 1917 may have contributed 
by themselves (together with those of the enemies of the two revolutions) to 
re-ideologize and fanaticize the war; but, at the same time, ripping off from the 
phenomenon of war its mask of natural fatality, those ideas raised a huge criticism 
and control of the war and warlike activities from below. It is true that the 
revolutionary universalism has become, under concrete historical circumstances, 
an instrument of expansion, but such expansionism finds its limitations and an 
effective counter-tendency precisely in the revolutionary universalism. It is not by 
chance that, in his polemics against the theoreticians of the exportation of the 
revolution in the Brissot way, Robespierre (1958, v.I, p.114-5) warns against the 
danger of roaming along the road of the Ancient Regime: “If in the beginning 
you violate their territories, you will irritate the peoples of Germany [...], in 
whom the cruelties executed in Rheinland-Pfalz by the generals have left deeper 
impressions than those that some forbidden opuscules could leave”; a French 
invasion “could revive the memory of the burning of Rheinland-Pfalz” (ibidem, 
p.130). Brissot had eventually situated himself on an objective line of continuity 
with the Ancient Regime, while Robespierre’s concerns expressed the new 
content of the revolution.
We should, though, ponder on another aspect: for the first time, with 
the French Revolution, the colonial domination and the war are questioned at 
the same time. It is a questioning that is, obviously, absent in the Dutch and 
English revolutions (strongly driven by the wish of an active participation in the 
appropriation of the colonial spoils), but which is equally absent in the American 
revolution, during which the claim for the national independence is mixed, from 
the very beginning, with the ambition of constituting a new empire to replace 
the English empire (Bairati, 1975). On the other hand, it is in the course of the 
French Revolution that voices from personalities so different from each other 
such as Dupont de Nemours and Robespierre raise to call out “Death to the 
colonies!”, if their maintenance should mean the sacrifice of freedom or of the 
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revolutionary ideals (cf. Dockès, 1989, p.85). It is not by chance that, years later, 
the major blow of accusation that Renan (1982, p.103) will aim at the French 
Revolution will be, precisely, of having blocked “the development of the colonies 
[...] obstructing, this way, the only way out through which the modern States can 
escape from the problems of socialism”.19
Notes
1  This text resumes the article published in Procès (v.19, p.153-71, 1990).
2   Thus, already in the title of the text volumes: Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle 
en Europe, Utrecht 1713, e Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les souverains 
chrétiens, Utrecht 1717. See Saint-Pierre (1986, p.7ss and 429ss).
3  Thus, according to Rousseau’s synthesis (1959, v.III, p.585ss). It is in the volume of 1717 
that the union of Christian States is presented under the form of a military alliance against 
the Turks (see Saitta, 1948, p.72).
4  Mirabeau’s speech, August 17, 1789 (in Buchez & Roux, 1834, v.II, p.274ss).
5  Like the Duke of Preslin, mentioned by Saitta (1948, p.119).
6  Barnave, May 21, 1790 (in Buchez & Roux, 1834, v.VI, p.109).
7  Locke (1823, p.414ss), mentioning the colonial trade with Africa, declares more than 
once that “all the commodities brought from thence, are gold-dust, ivory, and slaves.” 
8  Cf. L’Ami du peuple, n.624 (in Césaire, 1961, p.175ss).
9  Passage quoted as from the French version of J. Gibelin (Kant, 1948).
10 About the relation between Kant and the French Revolution, see Losurdo (1983).
11 Text in Buchez & Roux (1834, v.XXVI, p.155).
12 See the Manifest divulged by the first Congress of the Communist International in Agosti
(1974, p.64).
13 “Strategical issues of the revolutionary war in China”, of 1936 (quoted from: Mao Tse
Tung, 1966, v.I, p.195 - cf. Port. ed. Mao Tsé-tung, 2004).
14 “Relation on the ratification of the treaty of peace”, of 03.14.1918, and “Relation on war 
and peace”, of 03.07.1918, in Lenin (1955, v.XXVII, p.165ss and 90ss).
15 Cf. Burke, s. d., v.VII, p.382, 354, 432, 472, 387, 384, for the following quotations, 
letters to diverse correspondents, in 1793.
16 Letter from Pius VI, in Burke (s. d., v.VII, p.420).
17 Cf. Losurdo, “La révolution, la nation et la paix», in La Pensée, v.267, p.85-93, janv.-fév. 
1989.
18 See Losurdo in Gazzaniga et al. (1989, p.114-6 e 137-47).
19 Also the Nouvelle Droite, in spite of its “differentialist” fashion, continues to accuse the 
French Revolution of having harmed or jeopardized the colonial domination.
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